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THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES AND "THE
SUBSTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS."*
INTRODUCTORY.

THE

United States Supreme Court has repeatedly de-

clared that the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution relate not only to procedure but also to substantive law.

The reasons for that declaration have received but little
attention from either judges or text-writers. As, however,
the declaration is unquestionably of great importance, we
shall in this article consider briefly some of those reasons.
"THE SUBSTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS."

The clearest argument in support of the position that the
due process clauses concern more than procedure seems to
have been made in the opinion in Hurtado v. California,' in
which the court admitted that in England the legislative
department of government was not in any respect whatever
restricted by the constitutional provision, which the court
has declared to be closely akin to the due process requirement, 2 that no one should be deprived of life, liberty or
* Copyright, 19IO, by Robert P. Reeder.

(1884) iio U. S. i6, 4 Sup. Ct.
See cases in note 14, infra.

i1, 292.
('9')
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property except in accordance with the law of the land.
The court said that, although the provisions of Magna
Carta were directed against the King and Acts of Paliament were always regarded as consistent with the law of the
land, yet in this country the provisions in our Bills of
Rights are limitations upon all departments of government,
and for that reason provisions taken from the English constitution have a broader meaning than they had in England and must be held to guarantee not particular forms of
procedure but the very substance of individual rights to
life, liberty and property."
' "The concessions of Magna Carta were wrung from the King as
guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations of his prerogative.
It did not enter into the minds of the barons to provide security against
their own body or in favor of the Commons by limiting the power of
Parliament; so that bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws declaring
forfeitures of estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation which
occur so frequently in English history, were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land; for notwithstanding what was attributed to Lord Coke in Bonham's Case, (i6og) 8 Coke, I14a, ii8a, the
omnipotence of Parliament over the common law was absolute, even
against common right and reason. The actual and practical security for
English liberty against legislative tyranny was the power of a free public
opinion represented by the Commons. In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties of the
people against the encroachments of power delegated to their governments, and the provisions of Maga Carta were incorporated into Bills
of Rights. They were limitations upon all the powers of government,
legislative as well as executive and judicial. It necessarily happened,
therefore, that as these broad and general maxims of liberty and justice held in our system a different place and performed a different
function from their position and office in English constitutional history
and law, they would receive and justify a corresponding and more
comprehensive interpretation. Applied in England only as guards against
executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also
against arbitrary legislation; but, in that application, as it would be incongruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English
law, they must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure,
but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty and property :"
Hurtado v. California, (1884) 110 U. S. 516, 531, 532, 4 Sup. Ct. II1, 292,
i1g. See also iio U. S. at 535-537,4 Sup. Ct. at 120, I21 ; Davidson v. New
Orleans, (1877) 96 U. S. 97,102; and concurring opinion in the latter case.
Compare 96 U. S. at iO3, 1O4. The court, in the Hurtado case, added, "Restraints that could be fastened upon executive authority with precision and
detail, might prove obstructive and injurious when imposed on the just
and necessary discretion of legislative power; and while in every instance
laws that violated express and specific injunctions and prohibitions might,
without embarrassment, be judicially declared to be void, yet any general
principle or maxim, founded on the essential nature of law, as a just and
reasonable expression of the public will and of government, as insti-
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In that case the statute under consideration, which dealt
only with a question of procedure, was sustained. The opinion furnishes, however, what is apparently the clearest argument which has been made in support of the position,
which the court has taken in other cases, that the due process
clauses restrict all departments of government, 4 and are
not sufficiently complied with by a mere observance of formalities. 5 The court practically assumed that all of the
provisions in our Bills of Rights apply to all organs of
government and said that for that reason the provision must
relate to more than procedure.
COMPARISON OF AMENDMENTS.

Before taking up the definite argument of the court, we
must note that in our discussion of the due process clauses
tuted by popular consent and for the general good, can only be
applied to cases coming clearly within the scope of its spirit and purpose, and not to legislative provisions merely establishing forms and
modes of attainment. Such regulations, to adopt a sentence of Burke's,
'may alter the mode and application but have no power over the substance of original justice.'"
'See, g. g., Murray'sLessee v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., (855) 18 How.
272, 276; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, (1897) 166 U. S. 226, 233,
234, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 583; Hovey v. Elliott, (1897)

167 U. S. 409, 417,

Sup. Ct. 841, 844; and also Westervelt v. Gregg, (1854) 12 N. Y. 202,
Compare
212; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, (819) 4 Wheat. 235, 244.
Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875) 92 U. S. go, 93.
'See language used in Long L W. S. Co. v. Brooklyn, (1897) 166 U.
S.685, 695, 17 Sup. Ct. 718, 722; Lochner v. New York, (i9o5) igs U.
S.45, 56, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 542; Fayerweatherv. Ritch, (1904) 195 U. S.
276, 297, 298, 25 Sup. Ct. 58, 63, 64; Simon v. Craft, (igoi) 182 U. S.
17

427, 436, 21 Sup. Ct. 836, 839; and also King v. Hatfield, (19oo) 13o Fed.
564, 582; Scott v. City of Toledo, (1888) 36 Fed. 385, 393; decisions to

the same effect in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People, (19o6) 200 U. S.
561, 26 Sup. Ct. 241; Lochner v. New York, supra; Dobbins v. Los
Angeles, (1904) 195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18; Prout v. Starr, (1903)
188 U. S.537, 23 Sup. Ct. 398; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkils, (1900) 176 U. S. 167, 20 Sup. Ct. 336; Green B. & M. C. Co. v.
Patten P. Co., (1898) 172 U. S. 58, 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 97, io6, (1899) 173
U. S. 179, 19 Sup. Ct. 316; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, (1897) 165 U. S. 578,
17 Sup. Ct. 427; Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, (1896) 164 U. S.
403, 17 Sup. Ct. 130; Kaukauna W. P. Co. v. Green B. & M. C. Co.,
(1891) 142 U. S.

254,

269, 271, 12 Sup. Ct. 173, 176, 177.

But compare

Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 157, 158, 17 Sup.
Ct. 56, 62, 63; Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875) 92 U. S.90, 93; concurring
opinion in Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, (1goo) 178 U. S.548, 58s,
20 Sup. Ct. 890, 1009, 903, 904-
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we shall assume that, standing alone, their terms have the
same meaning in both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The United States Supreme Court
makes this assumption as a working hypothesis ;7 and,
8 Of course, other provisions of the Federal Constitution secure to the
individual procedural as well as substantive rights against the federal
government which they do not secure to him against state action: see
e. g., West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U. S. 258, 24 Sup. Ct 650; Maxwell

v. Dow, (igoo) 176 U. S. 581, 2o Sup. Ct. 448, 494. This point is to be

considered in connection with pages 2o5, 2o6, infra.
"While we need not affirm that in no instance could a distinction be
taken, ordinarily if an Act of Congress is valid under the Fifth Amendment it would be hard to say that a state law in like terms was void
under the Fourteenth :" Carroll v. Greenwich I. Co., (195o)
199 U. S.
401, 410, 26 Sup. Ct. 66, 67. "The purpose of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same
protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty and
property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress :" Tonawanda v. Lyon, (igol) 181 U. S. 389, 391, '2I
Sup. Ct. 6o9, 61o, quoted approvingly in Hibben v. Smith, (19o3) 191
U. S. 310, 325, 24 SUp. Ct. 88, 92. We "shall proceed, in the present
case, on the assumption that the legal import of the phrase 'due process
of law' is the same in both Amendments. Certainly, it cannot be supposed that, by the Fourteenth Amendment, it was intended to impose on
the states, when exercising their powers of taxation, any more rigid or
stricter curb than that imposed on the federal government, in a similar
exercise of power, by the Fifth Amendment :" French v. Barber A. P.
Co., (19Ol) 181 U. S. 324, 329, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 627. See also Detroit v.
Parker, (19Ol) 181 U. S. 399, 401, 21 Sup. Ct. 624, 625; dissenting
opinion in Tonawanda v. Lyon, (19Ol) 181 U. S. 389, 393, 21 Sup. t.
6og, 611; In re Kemmler, (189o) 136 U. S. 436, 448, io Sup. Ct. 93o, 934;
Hurtado v. California, (1884) IO U. S. 516, 534, 535, 4 Sup. Ct. III,
292, 120 (in the latter two cases, however, it is possible that a distinction
is made); dissenting opinion in Wight v. Davidson, (19Ol) 181 U. S.
371, 387, 21 Sup. Ct 616, 622. "It is not a little remarkable, that while
this provision has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a
restraint upon the authority of the federal government, for nearly a
century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which the
powers of that government have been exercised has been watched with
jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches,
this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the
judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public discussion. But
while it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the
power of the states, only a very few years, the docket of this court is
crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and
state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence
that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this
provision as found in the Fourteenth Amendment:" Davidson v. New
Orleans, (877)
96 U. S. 97, 103, 104. Compare Wight v. Davidson,
(1901) 181 U. S. 371, 384, 21 Sup. Ct. 616, 621, where it is said: "It by
no means necessarily follows that a long and consistent construction
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indeed, as both Amendments are part of the same Constitution such a working hypothesis is not unnatural."
The variations in the texts of the two provisions are
unimportant,9 save, of course, that the provisions relate to
different governments ;1o and while the contexts of the provisions are unlike, 1' the court apparently does not consider
that fact important. It is true that a period of nearly eighty
years separated the adoptions of the two Amendments, and it
has been said that for that reason "it may be that questions
may arise in which different constructions and applications
put upon the Fifth Amendment . . . is to be deemed overruled by a
decision concerning the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
controlling state legislation ;" and French v. Barber A. P. Co., (igol)
18r U. S. 324, 328, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 626, where it is said: "While the
language of those Amendments is the same, yet as they were engrafted
upon the Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances of our national life, it may be that questions may arise in which
different constructions and applications of their provisions may be
proper."
"'The Constitution of the United States, with the several Amendments thereof, must be regarded as one instrument, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal validity:" Prout v. Starr, (19o3) 188
U. S. 537, 543,.23 Sup. Ct. 398, 400. "While the [state] constitution as
it now stands it to be considered as a whole as if enacted at one time,
to ascertain the meaning of particular expressions it may be necessary
to give attention to the circumstances under which they became parts
of the instrument:" Thompson v. Kidder, (i9o6) 74 N. H. 89, 91, 65
Atl. 392, 393.

'Neither provision is expressly addressed to or confined to any particular branch of government to which it relates, so that it is difficult
to see from the texts that either relates to fewer or more branches of
government than the other. So far as the texts are concerned, there
are as strong reasons for implying "by any organ of government' in
one provision as in the other-and no stronger reasons.
"The Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government:
Barrington v. Missouri, (1907) 205 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 582; Jack v.
Kansas, (i9o5) '99 U. S. 372, 26 Sup. Ct. 73; Ohio v. Dollison, (i9o4)
194 U. S. 445, 24 Sup. Ct. 703; Winous P. S. C. v. Casperson, (igo4)
193 U S. i89, 24 Sup. Ct. 43i; Capital C. D. Co. v. Ohio, (1902) 183

U. S. 238, 22 Sup. Ct. 120. That the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to the state governments and does not apply to the federal government
is clear in spite of expressions in Patterson v. Bark Eudora, (19o3)
19o U. S. i69, 23 Sup. Ct. 821; Plessy v. Ferguson, (i896) 163 U. S.
537, 551, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 1143.
" See pages 212, 216, infra.
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of their provisions may be proper;' 2 but the court does not
seek to interpret either provision from the standpoint of the
time of its adoption. 13
"THE LAW OF THE LAND."

Before taking up the argument of the court it seems advisable to consider also the bearing of the statement which
is sometimes made,' 4 and which the court referred to in the
I-Hurtado case, 15 that the due process provision is akin to the
English provision that named deprivations must not be
made unless by the law of the land.
It seems that when the term "the law of the land" was
'French v. Barber 4.P. Co., (igoi) 181 U. S. 324, 328, 21 Sup. Ct.
625, 626, quoted at end of note 7, supra.
'Yet see United States v. Burr, (1807) 4 Cr. 469, 470; Schick v.
United States, (19o4) 19s U. S. 65, 69, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 827; Robertson
v. Baldwin, (1897)

165 U. S. 275, 281, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 329; on the duty

of determining whether terms had established meanings when used and,
if so, of applying them in accordance with those meanings. Consider
also Maxwell v. Dow, (19oo)

176 U. S. 581, 602, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 494,

456; Pittman v. Byars, (i9o8)
Tex. Civ. App.
, 112 S. W. 102.In the interval between the adoptions of the two Amendments the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the provision in the Fifth
Amendment and many state courts interpreted similar provisions in
state constitutions. The courts so often relied upon unconvincing reasoning that permanent interpretation and uniformity among the several
jurisdictions alike seem extremely improbable, although an examination of the state decisions would require too much time to warrant its
being made for purposes of this article. Yet if it were shown that the
various decisions were in general accord at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, those decisions should help to fix the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they were erroneous as to the provisions they interpreted and were now all overruled.
Of course we must remember that a great deal of weight is due to the
interpretations, and especially the unchallenged interpretations, which
other departments of the state and federal governments showed by their
actions that they placed upon the provisions: see Patterson, The United
States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 234.
" Twining v. New Jersey, (19o8) 211 U. S. 78, IOO, lO5, lO8, 29 Sup.
Ct. 14, 20, 22, 23; Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875) 92 U. S.90, 93; Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., (1855) 18 How. 272, 276; and see Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Humes, (1885) 115 U. S. 512, 519, 6 Sup. Ct io,
112; Davidson v. New Orleans, (1877) 96 U. S. 97, IOI, 1O2; French v.
Barber A. P. Co., (igoi) 181 U. S. 324, 333, 21 Sup. Ct. 625, 628; In re
Kemmler, (189o) 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 934.

"5 In connection with language from opinion in that case quoted in
note 3, supra, see language later in opinion at Iio U. S.535, 4 Sup.
Ct. 120.
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used in chapter 39 of Magna Carta it related largely if not
exclusively to procedure, 16 and it is possible that it referred simply to the particular forms of procedure which
were lawful in the year I215.17 In later royal charters the
term "due process of law" was substituted, showing that
then if not in 1215 the desire related simply to procedure,' 8
and it seems that the desire was for procedure which was
lawful at the time of trial. In other words, it is quite possible that the "law of the land" provision of Magna Carta
was intended merely as a requirement that there should be
a procedure which was in accordance with the law of the
land, and that the due process provision in the later charters was intended merely as a requirement of a procedure
which was made due by the law of the land. Indeed, the
two provisions must be so understood if the court has been
correct in declaring that the provisions are closely akin. Of
course, if there was any difference in meaning between the
two provisions the provision for "due process of law" supplanted the provision for "the law of the land."
The term "the law of the land" is also sometimes used' 9 in
a broader sense as meaning the law of the state or the law of
the country and as relating to more than procedure. While
the provision for "the law of the land" when used in chapter
39 of Magna Carta probably related merely to procedure
and was intended simply as a requirement of what was
later called "due process of law," it certainly does not follow
that, on the other hand, the provision for due process of law
is equivalent to a provision for the law of the land when
the latter term is used in its broadest sense-as relating to
more than procedure.
"6See McKechnie, Magna Carta, 44o, 44r; Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, i99-2or; Bigelow, History of Procedure, 155,
note; Baldwin, The Courts as Conservators of Social Justice, 9 Col.
L. Rev. 571.
"TSee authorities cited in note 16, supra Compare page 200, infra.
"See Baldwin, The Courts as Conservators of Social Justice, 9 Col.
L. Rev. 569.
" As in Article VI of the Federal Constitution, where, however, there
is a qualifying adjective which limits its meaning.
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Still, even if we assume that "due process of law" means
"the law of the land" in the broadest sense of the latter
term, we must note that such a requirement would have in
general the same effect in this country as it would have in
England.
Of course, we have in this country a supreme law of the
land and when it speaks it must be obeyed by the organ or
organs of government to which it speaks. But not all of the
law of the jurisdiction is contained in the constitutions. This
truth is elementary. And that portion of the law of the
jurisdiction which is not contained in the constitutions is, in
this country as in England, changeable by the appropriate
authorities, although only the appropriate authorities may
change or disregard it.
In England the Parliament, subject to a veto power
which has not been exercised since 1707,20 may change
the law in any respect, 21 while the King has not for centuries
had the power to disregard the law or to change the law
without the consent of Parliament. 22 And in this country
the legislative department of government has a power to
change the law which is different from the power of a President or governor. The state legislatures, over subject-matters not withdrawn from their control, and Congress over
subject-matters entrusted to it, have all governmental
powers which are not entrusted by the constitutions to other
organs of government and which are not withdrawn from
the control of those legislative bodies by other provisions of
the constitutions, while the executive department of government, on the other hand, possesses only powers which
"Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 3d ed., I, 301.
2 See Blackstone, Commentaries, I, *91, *i6o-*i62; Lee v. Bude &
T. J. Ry. Co., (x871) L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 582; Courtney, The Working
Constitution of the United Kingdom, 4; Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 6th ed., 58 et seq.; Lowell, The Government of England, I,
9; Hurtado v. California, (1884) IIO U. S. 516, 531, 4 Sup. Ct. III, 292,
uIg; Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36, 65.
'Bill of Rights (1689); and see Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law, I, Ist ed., 152, 2d ed.,-i73; Anson, The Law and Custom
of the Constitution, 3d ed., I, chap. 9, I, pp. 33, 34; Lowell, The Government of England, I, 22; 12 Coke, 76 (i61i). Compare Lowell, op.
cit., I, 23, 24.
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are granted to it by law, and those povers must be exercised
in a manner recognized by law.2 3 In other words, we have

profited by the struggles which our ancestors had with their
kings and, by the distribution of governmental powers in
our constitutions, we have made it clear that our executives
are without power to act contrary to the law and have not
that power to change the law which our legislatures do
possess. The various departments of government stand in
the same relation to each other as regards the law of the
state or the law of the country in the United States as they
did in England.
To say, then, that all parts of the law of the land are
equally unchangeable, or to say that that part of the law
of the land which is not the supreme law ,of the land is
unchangeable by the legislature because unchangeable by
the executive, would be to disregard thoroughly established
distinctions. While other departments of government are
restrained by the law of the land, only that part of the law
of the land which the constitution makes the supreme law
of the land is unchangeable by legislation. 24 .
One point more remains to be noticed. It might be
claimed that a stipulation of a constitution that the law of
the land should be observed would require the observance
of the law of the jurisdiction as it stood at the time when
the provision was placed in the constitution. 25 And in support of that contention it might be said with truth that in
interpreting a provision of a constitution it must be given
the meaning which it had at the time of its adoption. 26 No
organ of government can change that meaning. Such a
change can be made only by constitutional amendment.
But while the inedning which the term "the law of the
land" had when placed in the constitution might not be
"See authorities cited in U. of Pa. L. Rev., Nov., i9o8, pp. 64, 65, 69.
"See also Sumpter v. State, (i9o6) 81 Ark. 6o, 62, 98 S. W. 719, 720.
"Consider Twining v. New Jersey, (1908) 211 U. S.78, ioo, 101, 29
Sup. Ct. 14, 2o.

"See authorities cited at beginning of note 13, supra.
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changed, it certainly does not follow that the contents of the
law of the land, except so much of it as is the supreme law
of the land, might not be changed by ordinary legislation.
The distinction will be shown best by referring to a case
which seems to be analogous. Congress cannot so narrow
the meaning of the word "crimes" in the second clause of
Article III of the Federal Constitution as to allow the
infliction of heavy penalties where the guilt of the person
convicted has not been determined by a jury;yet, while it
cannot change the meaning of the word "crimes," it can
27
unquestionably increase or diminish the number of crimes.
The Constitution did not crystallize and render unchangeable
the criminal law of a hundred and twenty years ago. And
so also the fact that the meaning of the term "the law of the
land" might not be altered by legislation certainly does not
show that the provisions of the law of the land might not
be changed in that manner.
Moreover, just as the meaning of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment remains the same
from year to year, so also it doubtless has the same meaning in one state as it has in another.28 But it does not
follow from this that the provision has the same ultimate
legal effect in all states, or, in other words, that a procedure
which must be observed in one state in order to afford due
process of law there must be observed in another state in
order to afford due process of law in the latter state, or vice
versa. Just as, as previously pointed out, there may be
changes in the law from time to time, so also it seems clear
29
that the law may be different in different states.
ALL ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT RESTRAINED.

Returning to the argument of the Supreme Court in the
Hurtado case,3 0 we may note that in saying that the pro' See Schick v. United States, (19o4) 195 U. S. 65, 24 Sup. Ct 826.
' See King v. Mullins, (1898) 71 U. S. 404, 422, 18 Sup. Ct. 925, 932.

"See

Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875)
"0See pages 191 to 193, supra.

92 U.

S. 90, 93.
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visions of our constitutions apply to all organs of government the court was probably influenced by the fact that
our Bills of Rights do contain some provisions which restrict our legislative bodies. Yet obviously it does not follow therefrom that all of the provisions are restraints upon
our legislatures. The fact that a constitution imposes restraints upon each of the departments of government no
more makes every restraint which that constitution imposes
upon one department binding upon the rest than the fact that
the Federal Constitution imposes restraints upon the federal government and restraints upon the states makes every
restraint which that Constitution imposes upon the one
binding upon the other.
And certainly it is not self-evident that every restraint
set forth in our constitutions is necessarily directed against
every department of government, especially where the provision is not unlimited in its terms. The requirement that
no taxes shall be levied except in accordance with a law
which originated in the House of Representatives does
not constitute any restraint upon the House of Representatives. And so also if when the due process provision was
placed in the Federal Constitution it meant that no person
should be deprived of life, .liberty or property except in the
manner prescribed by the law of the jurisdiction, the court
cannot properly say that the provision restricts a department
of govenment which was authorized to change procedure
in making such changes, and that if the original meaning
of the term "due process of law" does not fit in with the
assumption that all portions of the Constitution apply to
all departments of government the meaning of the term
must be changed rather than the assumption that the provision restrains all departments of government.
We shall not pause here to consider the actual meaning
of the term "due process of law." It is sufficient for our
present purpose to point out that the court is not warranted in slurring over the particular provisions without
careful examination and assuming that all of the provisions in our Bills of Rights necessarily restrain all depart-
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ments of government, and that the meanings of the
provisions must be such as will correspond with this assumption.
It will be observed that the court did not merely say
that a provision of the Constitution restricts all departments
of government to which, regardless of its original application, it might be applied without changing its original meaning. The court went further than that: it went further than
it would have gone if it had said, for instance, that, while
in England a provision in the constitution for trial by jury
would not have been a restraint upon legislative regulation
of judicial procedure, in this country such a provision Would
limit the activity of the legislature in that respect; for, regardless of the effect of such a provision in the mother
country, there is nothing in the nature or terms or history of that provision which would make it inapplicable as
a restraint upon legislation. But the court has gone even
further than the assumption that our legislatures are restrained by all of the provisions of the constitutions which,
regardless of their original applications, might be treated
as restraints upon legislation without changing their original meanings, and has practically assumed that all of the
provisions in our Bills of Rights necessarily restrain all of
the departments of government. And such an assumption,
it is submitted, is not justifiable.
SIGNIFICANCE OF WORD '"STATE."'

In interpreting the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court in some cases has laid stress upon
the fact that the requirement is that no "sfate" shall deprive without due process of law, and has said that the
word "state" must necessarily cover all organs of state
government. 3 1
'Ex parte Virginia, (1879) 100 U. S. 339. 347; Neal v. Delaware,
(88o) 103 U. S. 370, 397; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, (1897)
I66 U. S. 226, 233, 234, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 583; and see Lochner v. New
York, (9o5) 198 U. S. 45, 56, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 542; Davidson v. New
Orleans, (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 102; dissenting opinion in Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, (19oo) 178 U. S, 548, s9g, 6oo, 20 Sup. Ct. 904, 1014.
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Those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, by the
language which they used, showed unquestionably that they
intended to provide that organs of the state governments
should be bound by the due process requirement which had
theretofore bound only organs of the federal government,
and that if an organ of the federal government was bound
by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment the
similar organ of state government should be bound by the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet it is not clear
that they intended that their use of the word "state" should
32
have any greater significance than this.

Of course, if the due process clause had been the only
provision which was placed in the Constitution in Reconstruction times, it might possibly be said that to decide
that any organ of state government was not restrained by
it would be to make that sole protection for the freedmen
so inadequate that it could hardly be supposed that those
who amended the Constitution in those stirring times
intended that the provision should have simply that restraining force. But that is not the situation. The due
process clause is only one out of a number of provisions
which were placed in the Constitution at the same period.
For example, slavery was forbidden and legislation against
the freedmen was prevented in large measure by provisions
concerning the suffrage and representation. And so there is
no such reason as that which has just been suggested for saying that the due process clause must be regarded as a restraint upon all departments of government.
Still less can any one go on to claim that any particular
clause of the Amendments must, of necessity, have been
so framed as to meet every emergency; for that claim could
not be made even for the Reconstruction Amendments as
a whole. Nor is there anything in the contention that unless all organs of government are restrained the provision is
useless. 33 By the Federal Constitution the federal govern"See note 9,supra.
'" See cases in note 31, supra.
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ment is prevented from doing some things which a state
government may do, and vice versa. It is not said that
because a provision applies to only one government it does
not amount to any restraint whatever; and so also it cannot
be said that if a provision applies to only one department of government it has no restraining force. 4 And it
certainly cannot be contended that a provision must have as
extensive an effect as those who interpret it may consider
desirable.
ARGUMENT CONCERNING REDUNDANCY.

We have thus seen the inadequacy of several reasons
which have been or might be advanced in support of the
proposition that the due process clauses restrain Congress
and the state legislatures. Yet there is one other argument which might be advanced and which, after a few explanatory remarks, we must consider at greater length.
The due process provision does not declare what constitutes a "due" process. But, reading the words in their natural sense, it seems clear that "due" process means simply
the process which the person involved is entitled to receive.
The Constitution does not say that the process must be a
suitable process or a desirable process. It does not purport
to create any new procedural rights. It simply says that the
person involved shall receive the process which is due to
him. The "due"-ness of the process is thus left to depend
upon tests which are extrinsic to that clause of the Constitution; and the question, therefore, arises, What are those
tests ?
The United States Supreme Court in Walker v. Sauvinet 35 answered this question by saying that "due process
of law is process due according to the law of the land." In
view of the history of the provision this statement is plausible and it must be accepted unless it can be shown to be
"'The weakness of the contention is also shown by a consideration
of the language of the Constitution of Massachusetts, Part I, Articles
io and 30.

2' (1875) 92 U. S. 90, 93.
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incorrect or unless the validity of some other test can be
established. It must be noted, however, that the law of the
land which is binding is not the law of the land as it stood
when the Amendment was adopted, but the law of the land
as it stands from time to time.? That law consists of the
constitution, the statutory law, the common law, and
administrative regulations, naming the various kinds of
law in the order of their supremacy. And the larger part of
that law may be altered from time to time by the appropriate authorities, although it may be altered only by the
appropriate authorities. 37
But if the due process provision were so interpreted it
would be superfluous in the Fifth Amendment, although,
for reasons which will be pointed out, it would not be superfluous in the Fourteenth Amendment. And it may be
urged that an interpretation of a clause of the Constitution
under which that clause must be considered useless is necessarily unsound and that, therefore, the provision must have
some other meaning.
If the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment were
held to require merely that the procedure followed when a
person is deprived of life, liberty or property must be that
procedure which has been prescribed by the governmental
organ which has authority to prescribe the procedure, the
clause would be unnecessary, since the same restraint is
contained in those clauses of the Constitution which distribute governmental powers among three departments of
government.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would
still be superfluous even though it were held to require also
that the procedure do not violate procedural rights which
are secured by other provisions of the Federal Constitution;
and so also would the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
be superfluous if it referred merely to those procedural
rights which are secured by other provisions of the Federal
See pp. I98-2oo, supra.
See pp. 198-200, .supra.
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Constitution, such as the prohibition of bills of attainder
and the full faith and credit clause.
The due process clause of the latter Amendment could not
be regarded as superfluous if it were held to include in its
protection procedural rights secured by the respective state
constitutions or by statutes or subordinate regulations 38 in
those states, inasmuch as questions of compliance with the
procedural requirements would thus be made federal questions. But, as a matter of fact, the United States Supreme
Court in cases coming from state courts does not inquire
whether the action of an organ of state government conforms to the procedural requirements of the state constitution39 or to other valid procedural restraints upon the
organs of government;40 and in cases arising in federal
'As rules of court, ordinances, administrative regulations.
"West v. Louisiana, (i9o4) 194 U. S. 258, 24 Sup. Ct. 65o; Brown v.
New Jersey, (1899) 175 U. S. 172, 20 Sup. Ct. 77; Hallinger v. Davis,
(1892)

146 U. S. 314, 319, 13 Sup. Ct.

105,

IO7; Smith v. Jennings,

(19o7) 206 U. S. 276, 278, 27 Sup. Ct. 61o, 611; and see Walker v. Sauvinet, (1875) 92 U. S. go; Stickney v. Kelsey, (1908) 209 U. S. 419,
420, 28 Sup. Ct. 508, 5o9; Pattersonv. Colorado, (1907) 205 U. S. 454,
27 Sup. Ct. 556; Burt v. Smith, (i9o6) 203 U. S. 129, 135, 27 Sup. Ct.
37, 39; Forsyth v. Hammond, (1897) 166 U. S. 5o6, 518, 17 Sup. Ct. 665,
670; Long 1. W. S. Co. v. Brooklyn, (1897) 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup. Ct.
718; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 154, 155, 17
Sup. Ct. 56, 61, 62; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, (1907) 207 U. S. 161, 170, 176,

28 Sup. Ct. 40, 44, 45. The court has decided in Berea College v. Kentucky, (1908) 211 U. S. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33; Chanlerv. Kelsey, (i9o7)
205 U. S. 466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550; Western T. Assn. v. Greenberg, (19o7)
204 U. S. 359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384; St. Mary's F.-A. P. Co. v. West Virginia,
(19o6) 203 U. 5. 183 192, 27 Sup. Ct. 132, 135; Jack v. Kansas, (1905)
199 U. S. 372, 26 Sup. Ct. 73; Orr v. Gilman, (1902) 183 U. S. 278, 283,
22 Sup. Ct. 213, 217; Merchants' & M. Bank v. Pennsylvania, (1897) 167
U. S. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. 829, that it would not inquire into the correctness
of a decision of a state court that the action of an organ of state
government conformed to requirements of the state c6nstitution which
were other than procedural. Of course, the state court may not by any
alteration by construction of the state constitution destroy any substantial rights which have accrued under a valid contract: see Patterson, The United States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed.,
P. 139.

Castillo v. McConnico, (1898) 168 U. S. 674, 683, 684, 18 Sup. Ct. 229,
Ballard v. Hunter, (1907) 204 U. S. 241, 259, 260, 27 Sup. Ct. 261,
268; French v. Taylor, (19o5) 199 U. S. 274, 26 Sup. Ct. 76; Patterson
v. Colorado, (9o7) 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556; Rawlins v. Georgia,
(i9o6) 201 U S. 638, 26 Sup. Ct. 560; Long I. W. S. Co. v. Brooklyn,
(1897) 166 U. S. 685, 688, 17 Sup. Ct. 718, 719; Iowa C. Ry. Co. v. Iowa,
(1896) i6o U. S. 389, 16 Sup. Ct. 344. See also Londoner v. Denver,
233;
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courts those courts follow the interpretations which have
constitutions and the state statutes
been given to the state
41
by the state courts.
Now, unless the United States Supreme Court has decided
incorrectly when it declared that the Fourteenth Amendment "did not radically change the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other,
and of both governments to the people," 42 the federal
courts unquestionably ought, as a general rule, to follow
the decisions of state courts in matters of state law. But,
in view of the due process clause, it is quite possible that
they would be justified in going so far as to inquire into the
observance of procedural requirements; and the failure of
the federal courts to make such inquiries may be due to the
fact that they have never considered sufficiently the propriety of doing so.43
(i9o8) 210 U. S. 373, 379, 28 Sup. Ct. 708, 7I (the latter report of
the case being more complete than the former) ; Barrington v. Missouri,
(1907) 205 U. S. 483, 27 Slip. Ct. 582; National C. 0. Co. v. Texas,
(1od) 197 U. S. 115, 130, 131, 25 Sup. Ct. 379, 382; Forsyth v. Ham.nond, (1897) 166 U. S. 5o6, 518, 519, 17 Sup. Ct. 665, 670; Olsen v.
Smith, (1904) 195 U. S.332, 342, 25 Sup. Ct. 52, 54; W. W. Cargill Co.
v. Minnesota, (19Oi) i8o U. S. 452, 466, 21 Sup. Ct. 423, 428; Maiorano
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 268, 29 Sup. Ct. 424; Consolidated R. Co. v. Vermont, (1908) 207 U. S. 541, 551, 28 Sup. Ct.
178, i8o.
See PalIbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, (1896) 164 U. S.112, 154, 155,
17 Sup. Ct. 56, 61, 62; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, (19o6) 201 U. S.
245, 291, 26 Sup. Ct. 459, 461; and also authorities cited in Patterson,
The United States and the States Under the Constitution, 2d ed., p. 282.
"Felts v. Murphy, (19o6) 201 U. S. 123, 129, 26 Sup. Ct. 366, 368;
Orr v. Gilman, (1902) 183 U. S. 278, 286, 22 Sup. Ct. 213, 216; Maxwell
v. Dow, (igoo) 176 U. S. 581, 593, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 494, 453; McPherson
v. Blacker, (1892) 146 U. S. 1, 39, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 12; In re Kentmler,
(189o) 136 U. S. 436, 448, io Sup. Ct. 930, 934. See also Slaughter
House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36, 78; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley,
(1896) 164 U. S. 112, 157, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 62; Giozza v. Tiernan, (1893)
148 U. S. 657, 662, 13 Sup. Ct. 721, 723; Davidson v. New Orleans, (1877)
96 U. S.97, 103, lo4; Hodges v. United States, (19o6) 203 U. S. I, I6,
27 Sup. Ct. 6, 8; and the quotation of Provident Bank v. Billings, (1830)
4 Pet. 514, 563, with apparent approval, in Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers,
(19o6) 2Ol U. S. 246, 296, 26 Sup. Ct. 459, 463. Compare 32 Am. L.
Reg., N. S. iog6, 1o97.
" Professor Henry Schofield, in 3 II1. L. Rev. 195, contends that the
United States Supreme Court should inquire whether state courts
clearly disregard or misapply the laws of their respective states. He
does not. however, limit his contention to laws dealing with procedure.
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Still, under any of the interpretations of the due process
provision which have just been suggested, the clause in the
Fifth Amendment must be regarded as superfluous.
But it is not self-evident that there can be no repetition of
thought in the Constitution, and while the fact that under
a particular interpretation a provision of the Constitution
would be superfluous is entitled to weight, 44 it is not sufficient to prove that that interpretation is incorrect. Certainly if the provision had that meaning before it was
placed in the Constitution, or if there is a sufficient explanation of its insertion, although superfluous, in the Constitution, or if a different interpretation would require an exercise by the courts of power which was not granted to them
by the Constitution-such circumstances must outweigh any
argument concerning redundancy.
The due process provision did not appear for the first
time in the Fifth Amendment. 4 5 It had an*English origin.
The meaning which the provision possessed before it was
placed in the Federal Constitution may properly be considered by the court; and for that reason it was justifiable for
the court to declare in Walker v. Sauvinet4 that "due process of law is process due according to the law of the land."
The provision occurs in the Federal Constitution apparently as a survival from earlier times. Those who adopted
-the Fifth Amendment probably did not realize when they
placed the due process provision in the Constitution that
those clauses of the Constitution which distribute governmental powers among three departments of government
by necessary implication require that the procedure followed
must be one which has been prescribed by thegovernmental
organ which has authority to prescribe the procedure and
that it was unnecessary for them to follow precedent and
Hurtado v. California, (1884) 1io U. S. 516, 534, 4 Sup. Ct. II,
See also Davidson v. New Orleans, (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 105;
Mackin v. United States, (1886) 117 U. S. 348, 351, 352, 6 Sup. Ct. 777,
778, 779. Compare Yesler v. Washington H. L. Conrs., (1892) 146 U.
292, 120.

S. 646, 655, 13 Sup. Ct. 190, 194.

See pp. 197, supra, 213, infra.
(875) 92 U. S. 90, 93.
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insert the same restraint also in the form in which it appeared in the English Constitution. Or they may have desired, even at the expense of repetition, to make this restraint perfectly clear, through fear that there might some
day come into power a President who would not have a
scrupulous regard for the constitutional limitations upon his
authority.
Moreover, there is no other natural meaning of the words
"due process of law" than "the process to which the person
involved is entitled under the law of the land." There is
nothing in the Constitution to show that those who adopted
the Fifth Amendment intended to create any other test of
"due"-ness than that which would have existed if the due
process provision had been omitted from the Constitution.
In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken L.

&

I. Co., 47 the court

said that "the words 'due process of law' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words 'by
the law of the land' in Magna Carta," nd then fell into
error4" through its failure to realize that "the law of the
land" does not mean the law of the land as it stood when
the Amendment was adopted but the law of the land as it
stands from time to time.49 And the court, by the language used in a recent case,50 has shown that it does not yet
understand the nature of its error in the earlier case. But
when the term "the .law of the land" is interpreted correctly it will be clear that the Fifth Amendment did not
.create any new test of due-ness.
For the courts, then, to declare tests of due-ness which
are not authorized by the Federal Constitution is to exercise a veto-power which it was never intended that they
should exercise,51 and is judicial usurpation of the most
serious character.

(i855)
8
iS How. 272, 276.
Page 277.
"See pp. 198-200, supra.
Twinihg v. New Jersey, (9o8)

211 U. S. 78,

14,2 0.

" See authorities cited in note 54, infra.

100, 101, 29

Sup. Ct.
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RESTRAINT MORE THAN PROCEDURAL.

Yet even if it were clearly shown that the due process
provision constituted an independent restriction upon legislative regulation of procedure, it certainly would not follow
that the provision related also to substantive law. The
Amendments concerning jury trials limit the power of Congress over judicial procedure; but no one would think of
contending that those provisions deal with anything except
jury trials; and in the argument in the opinion in the Hurtado case 52 the court does not show any stronger reason
for saying that the due process clauses must relate to more
than procedure.
Of course, our constitutions do in places deal with substantive law. The provisions relating to religious freedom
and the provisions relating to slavery are instances of such
provisions. Buf it is also clear beyond dispute that those
who adopted our constitutions at other times sought to
secure good government indirectly, and only indirectly, by
provisions concerning governmental methods.
The men who adopted the Fifth Amendment were men
who placed a large amount of dependence upon forms and
institutions.5 3 They relied largely upon what they considered an appropriate distribution and separation of the
powers of government, upon popular representation in the
legislature, and upon trial by jury. In conformity with
See pp. I9x-I93, supra.

Sir Frederick Pollock speaks of "the very common error, especially
prevalent in the eighteenth century, of attributing a corstant and infallible efficacy to the forms of government :" Pollock's Maine's Ancient
Law, 175. Professor Thayer says, "The chief protections were a wide
suffrage, short terms of office, a double legislative chamber, and the so'

called executive veto. There was, in general, the greatest unwillingness
to give the judiciary any share in the law-making power:" Legal Essays, I, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 137, note. Chief Justice Marshall says, "The

wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war,
the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely, in all representative governments :" Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9
Wheat I, 197. See also 7 Harv. L. Rev. 136; 2 Kent, Coin. *ii.
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these views they were unwilling that the judiciary should
pass upon the desirability of legislation ;54 and they were so
well satisfied with trial by jury that by the Seventh Amendment, which was adopted at the same time as the Fifth
Amendment, they were careful to provide that no appellate
federal tribunal should consider whether the verdict of a
jury in a trial at common law were against the weight of
the evidence. 55 Moreover, in the Reconstruction Amendments provisions concerning elections and office-holding
take up fully one-half of the space and show that those who
adopted the Reconstruction Amendments relied largely upon
the organization of the state governments for the securing
of fair treatment to the freedmen.
These illustrations show that those who adopted the first
ten Amendments and those who adopted the Reconstruction
Amendments believed that by providing carefully as to the
agencies of government they were doing much towards securing good government. Such provisions cannot by any
flight of the imagination be construed as relating directly
to substantive law; and there are other provisions of the
United States Constitution which are unquestionably strictly
procedural. Therefore, we cannot say that a clause of the
Constitution necessarily "must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of indi" Elliot's Debates, V. 151, 155, 164, z66, 344, 428; note 53, supra; and
see 32 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 1O94, noo, 11o3.
' Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, (1897) i66 U. S. 226, 242, 246,
17 Sup. Ct. 58i, 587, 588. See also Chrisman v. Miller, (1905) 197 U. S.

3r3, 25 Sup. Ct. 468, cases there cited, and Backus v. Fort S. U. D. Co.,
(1W88) 169 U. S. 557, 565, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 449; Mammoth M. Co. v.
213 U. S. 72, 73, 29 Sup. Ct. 4T3, 414. ComGrand C. M. Co., (199o)
pare Capital T Co. v. Hof, (1899) 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 58o; Ubarri
v. Laborde, (IgOg) 214 U. S.168, 171, 29 Sup. Ct. 549, 551; Empire S.
C.Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (19o8), 210 U. S. r, 28 Sup. Ct.
6o7. Under the judiciary act the United States Supreme Court cannot review findings of fact by state courts: Dower v. Richards, (1894)
isi U. S. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. 452; Bement v. National H. Co., (i9O2) i86 U.
S.70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, (x9o4)
193 U. S.53, 24 Sup. Ct. 396. The court may, however, it seems, review
findings of fact by lower federal courts in so far as they involve questions of the jurisdiction of those courts: see Commercial M. A. Co. v.
Davis, (1909) 213 U. S.245, 256, 29 Sup. Ct. 445, 448.
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vidual rights to life, liberty and property," 56 but we must,
instead, inquire as to the particular clause whether it has in
fact that effect.
EXAMINATION OF CONTEXT OF PROVISION.

On looking at the context of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment it will be observed that the preceding
clauses and the succeeding Amendment deal exclusively with
the conduct of criminal trials, thus tending to show by mere
association that the clause deals solely with procedure.
Indeed, the only apparent objection to deriving this interpretation from the context lies in the fact that the due
process clause is immediately followed by a provision that
private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. And at first glance the presence of
the just compensation provision seems to make it impossible
to draw an interpretation of the due process clause from its
context.
But if we consider the probability of some logical connection betwen contiguous clauses of the same Amendment
and examine the provisions more closely with this thought
in mind we shall see that the apparent difficulty is not a
real one. If the due process clause, like the preceding clauses
of the Fifth Amendment, deals with the conduct of criminal
trials and with a taking by the public in order to punish, it
may be naturally followed by a provision relating to a taking
by the public, not in order to punish but because the public
wants the thing taken. There is just such a contrast in
thought between the two clauses as to make it natural to
place them together. And we must notice that only on that
interpretation of the due process clause does-it belong logically in that portion of the Constitution in which it was
placed; and only on that interpretation of the due process
clause was it logical to place the just compensation provision
immediately after the due process provision.
Moreover, it is significant that it is not only in the Federal
" See Hurtado v. California,quoted in note 3, supra.
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Constitution that the due process clause is so placed, but, as
an able writer in the Harvard Law Review has declared
with reference to the state constitutions also, the provision
with which we are dealing is "in almost every instance inserted in a section of the constitution dealing exclusively
with the conduct of criminal trials." 57 And the reference to
deprivation of life in the due process clause shows clearly
that the clause is one which relates to the enforcement of
law.
The author whom we have just quoted has pointed out
steps by which the provisions of Magna Carta that "no
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned

.

.

.

unless by the

lawful judgment of his peers and5 8 by the law of the land"
has become our due process provision and shown that the
term "liberty" when used in connection with the due process requirement means "nothing more or less than freedom
of the person from restraint,-the great Habeas Corpus
principle of Anglican liberty,-a right the illegal invasion of
which gives rise to an action of false arrest or imprisonment." 59 And he has, by an examination of other provisions of our constitutions, shown abundant reasons for
saying that the term "liberty" was so understood when
placed in this portion of the.Federal Constitution."
"LIBERTY" IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

The United States Supreme Court, however, in recent
cases has given a far different interpretation to that term,
and incidentally to the entire due process provision, both
" Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those
Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life,
Liberty and Property," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, at 369.
On this word see McKechnie, Magna Carta, 436, 442, 443.
Ubi supra, 4 Harv L. Rev. at 382; and see ibid. 376.
Ubi supra, 4 Harv. L. Rev. at 369, 380-382. And on the meaning of
the term "liberty" see also book review in 12 Harv. L. Rev. at 44o; Ex
parte Boyce, (19o4) 27 Nev. 299, 354, 75 Pac. I, 12, 65 L. R. A. 47, 64;
Baldwin, The Courts of Conservators of Social Justice, 9 Col. L. Rev.
567, 569. Compare Prentice, Congress and the Regulation of Corporations, ig Harv. L. Rev. at i8o et seq.; Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 1
P. Williams, i8r, 188; Coke, Institutes, II, *47; Corwin, The Supreme
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in the Fifth Amendment 6 ' and in the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 the court saying in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 3 that
the liberty mentioned "means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 Mich. L. Rev. at 626.
The term "liberty" is also used in a different sense in English law as
meaning a franchise or privilege: see McKechnie, Magna Carta, 445;
Dominus Rex. v. Kilderby, (1671)

I Saund. 312;

Ritchie, Natural

Rights, 7; 4 Harv. L. Rev. 372, note; ibid. 375. The meanings should
no more be confused than should the general power of Congress to lay
duties be construed as a general power to say what it shall be the duty
of men to do. Nor should either meaning be confused with that which
has been given to the term by the United States Supreme Court and
which we shall consider at once. If the word "liberty" had a definite
meaning when used in a due process provision, meanings which it had
in other connections are irrelevant.
'Adair v. United States, (19o8) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277. Compare Addyston P. & S. Co. v. United States, (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 228,
229, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 103; United States v. Joint T. Assn., (I898) 171 U.
S. 505, 572, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, 33; and also Buttfield v. Stranahan, (1904)
192 U. S. 470, 493, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 354.
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, (1897) 165 U. S.578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. 427,
431; Lochner v. New York, (I9o5) 198 U. S.45, 53, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 541;
211 U. S.539, 545, 29 Sup. Ct. 2o6,
and see McLean v. Arkansas, (199o)
207; Muller v. Oregon, (9o8) 208 U. S.412, 421, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 326;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, (1905) 197 U. S. 1I, 26, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358,
361, 362; Smiley v. Kansas, (9o5) I96 U. S. 447, 456, 25 Sup. Ct. 289,
184 U. S.425, 428. 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 426;
291; Booth v Illinois, (9o2)
W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, (I9oi) 18o U. S.452, 467, 21 Sup. Ct.
423, 429; Williams v. Fears, (19oo) 179 U. S. 270, 274, 21 Sup. Ct. 128,
129; dissenting opinion in Taylor and Marshall v. Beck ham, (igoo) 178
U. S. 548, 603, 20 Sup. Ct. 89o, io16. Compare Northwestern N. L. I.
Co. v. Riggs, (i9o6) 203 U. S. 243, 255, 27 Sup. Ct." 126, x29; Berea
College v. Kentucky, (1908) 21I U. S.45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33; Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, (1907) 207 U. S.338, 357, 28 Sup. Ct. 114, 120;
Western T. Assn. v. Greenberg, (1907) 204 U. S.359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384,
-Of

decisions which were similar to that in Lochner v. New York, supra,

Professor Seager has said that they have "implanted in the minds of
workingmen a thorough distrust of the courts :" The Attitude of American Courts Towards Restrictive Labor Laws, ig Pol. Sci. Quar. 589.
See also G. W. Alger, Moral Overstrain, essay entitled "Some Equivocal
Rights of Labor;" and book review 24 Pol. Sci. Quar. 318, 319.
2 (897) 165 U. S. 578, 589, I7 Sup. Ct. 427, 431.
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proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned." While
later decisions have made somewhat clearer the effect which
the court gives to the term "liberty," the opinions usually
refer back to the Allgeyer case.
Nevertheless, the importance of the decision in the Allgeyer case is somewhat diminished by the infelicity of the
language we have quoted. The passage even shows confusion in thought. It will be observed that the court alternates
between the omission and use of the word "lawful" in the
several phrases. The unqualified statements of freedom
from restraint are obviously incorrect, for it is clear that
some restraints may constitutionally be imposed. And, on
the other hand, the statement that men may do anything
which is lawful, while obviously correct, does not solve the
question under consideration. It does not show what are
the limitations upon the restraining power of the law-making department of government.
The decision in the Allgeyer case was based upon the
language of Justice Bradley in Butchers' U. Co. v. Crescent C. Co.6 4 in an opinion which did not receive the ap-

proval of a majority of the court and which if approved
would have meant the reversal of an earlier decision of the
court from which Justice Bradley had dissented, 65 and upon
a dictum which a justice who had concurred in Justice
" (1884) iii U. S. 746. 762, 764, 765, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 657, 658. The
use in the Declaration of Independence of the terms "liberty" and "pursuit of happiness" together does not show that the meaning of the latter
term, which is omitted from the due process clause, is included in the
meaning of the former term.-It is not clear that the attitude towards
government when the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted was precisely the same as that which from a few
prefatory words in the Declaration of Independence we may possibly
think was taken in 1776. Did the people who adopted those Amendments
show no paternalistic sentiment through their representatives in Congress?
' Part of the language quoted in the Allgeyer case was directly in
conflict with the decision in the Slaughter House Cases, (1872) 16 Wall.
.6. on a point concerning which the court said in Twining v. New
Jersey, (19o8) 211 U. S. 78, 96, 29 Sup. Ct. 14. 18, "This part at least
of the Slaughter House Cases has been steadily adhered to by this
court."
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Bradley's opinion in the Butchers' Union case had placed
in the opinion in Powell v. Pennylvania.66 The bulk of the
language quoted above was copied almost verbatim from
an opinion of the New York Court of Appeals 67 which in
turn refers approvingly to the before-mentioned opinion of
Justice Bradley in the Butchers' Union case, to an opinion
by the same justice in cirtuit court which declared unconstitutional a law which the Supreme Court afterwards declared constitutional, and to a dissenting opinion by Justice
Field. No other remarks by justices of the United States
Supreme Court on "liberty"
are referred to in the opinion
68
of the New York court.
POSITION OF COURT CRITICISED.

The interpretation which the Supreme Court has given
to the term "liberty" was given without consideration of the
context of the due process provision. The court approached
the question in dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment,
where the context is not instructive. But as the context of
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment does not show
that its meaning there is different from its meaning in the
Fifth Amendment, it seems clear that any light which the
context casts upon the meaning in the earlier Amendment
should apply to the meaning in the subsequent Amendment.
And it will be observed that the court interprets both Amendments alike. 69 Moreover, not only has the court not consid' (1888)

127 U. S. 678, 684, 7 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257, 995.

'In re Jacobs, (1885) 98 N. Y. o8. On the disastrous effect of the
decision in the New York case see Kelley, Some Ethical Gains Through
Legislation, 253.
' It may be added that the court does quote federal authorities on
judicial inquiry, not into the exercise of the enumerated powers of
Congress, but into the exercise of what are called the implied powersinquiry whether powers which it is claimed are impliable from the
enumerated powers of Congress are in reality so impliable. But it
does not appear how the question, which is sometimes raised by federal
statutes, can be raised by state legislation. Unless New York is different from most states, its legislature is .unlike Congress in that the
legislature has all powers which are not denied to it expressly or by
necessary implication from grants to other departments of government.
The bearing of those quotations upon state legislation is not apparent.
' See pp. 194, 214, supra.
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ered the context of the due process provision, but it has not
considered the historical meaning of the provision or even
some of the earlier decisions of the court itself.70
It is possible that if such matters were properly brought
to the attention of the court the question would be re-examined. Certainly it is the duty of the court, when interpreting
provisions of the Constitution, to ascertain whether the terms
had established meanings when placed in the Constitution
and, if so, to apply them in accordance with those meanings. 7 1 And it seems clear that when the due process provision was placed in the Federal Constitution it referred
simply to those deprivations which are usually made by
way of punishment and that it referred simply to procedure.
CONCLUSION.

We have not attempted in this article to consider all of
the grounds upon which the courts have declared that
legislation which deals with substantive law may be in violation of the due process provision. But we have considered what is perhaps the clearest statement in support of that
position, namely that in which the contention is made that
the due process clauses are necessarily in themselves restraints upon all departments of government, and that con" See comment of C. E. Shattuck, in 4 Harv. L. Rev. at 386, on the
decision in the SlaughterHouse Cases, (1872) 16 Wall. 36: "The court
did not, apparently, consider it even arguable that the restraint upon
following their lawful calling was a deprivation of 'liberty.' Moreover,
the decision does not rest, so far as this clause is concerned, upon the
ground that the act was a fair exercise of the police power, and so was
due process of law. It proceeds on the ground that the Fourteenth
Amendment has no application whatever to such a right as that contended for, namely, the right of every man to pursue a lawful occupation. So that the actual decision in the case is against, rather than in
favor of, the broad construction of the term 'liberty.'" See also in
the comment of that author on the decision in Bradwell v. State, (1872)
16 Wall. 13o.-McGehee, Due Process of Law, 138 et seq., quotes in the
text two passages from the opinions of Justice Field which the notes
show to be dissenting opinions; and Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions of the United States, 32, quotes from a dissenting opinion of
Justice Field with the misstatement that it was the opinion of the
court. The position which the court has taken in recent cases was not
taken by the court in earlier cases.
' See note 13, supra.
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sequently they relate to more than procedure; and we have
seen that the arguments in support of that contention are
unconvincing. We have then endeavored to find the correct
position upon this question by considering the provision in
the light of its context and its history, and we have thus
seen that there are abundant reasons for saying with positiveness that the courts should hold that the provision relates
only to procedure.
One point remains for our final consideration. It may
be admitted that when the due process provision was placed
in the Federal Constitution it did not refer to substantive
law. It may be admitted that upon every occasion upon
which the Supreme Court nullifies a law by declaring that
the provision does deal with substantive law it assumes a
power which those who adopted the provision never intended to bestow upon the court. And yet it may be claimed
that the interpretation of the due process provision has
been settled by repeated judicial decisions and that a change
in its interpretation would result in a large amount of confusion.
In reply it is sufficient to point to the present state of the
decisions concerning the due process clauses. Would the
law become more confused if the clauses were interpreted
correctly? Or has "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion" along present lines already woven a
tangled web, which must become more and more tangled as
time goes on?
Robert P. Reeder.

